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Chapter # 
DATA MINING AND ATTENTION 
CONSUMPTION 
ERIC GOLDMAN 
Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. Email:
eric.goldman@marquette.edu.  Website: http://www.ericgoldman.org.  Interested readers 
may wish to read my lengthier article on this topic, Attention Scarcity and Its Implications for
Privacy and Marketing Regulations (forthcoming 2005). 
Abstract: This Essay challenges the prevailing hostility towards data mining and direct 
marketing.  The Essay starts by defining data mining and shows that the only 
important step is how data is used, not its aggregation or sorting.  The Essay 
then discusses one particular type of data use, the sending of direct marketing.  
The Essay establishes a model for calculating the private utility experienced 
by a direct marketing recipient.  The model posits that utility is a function of 
the message’s substantive content, the degree of attention consumed, and the 
recipient’s reaction to receiving the message.  The Essay concludes with some 
policy recommendations intended to help conserve recipients’ attention while 
preserving space for direct marketing tailored to minority interests. 
Key words: Data mining, database, data warehouse, privacy, advertising, marketing, email, 
spam, telemarketing, direct marketing, direct mail, junk mail, customer 
relationship management (CRM), economics of attention, economics of 
marketing, externalities, Coase Theorem 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The term “data mining” has developed a pejorative taint.  Commentators 
frequently assume, without explication, that data mining is wrong or 
harmful,1 as if the harms of data mining are so universally acknowledged 
that no one would question the assumption. 
 
1 See, e.g., Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture: A Privacy 
Tort Response to Consumer Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 63 (2003) 
(providing examples of data aggregation and sorting without explaining the 
specific harms arising from these examples). 
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This Essay questions that assumption.  First, I question how data mining, 
without more, creates consequential harm.  If defined properly, data mining 
appears to be merely a prerequisite to possibly objectionable activity.  
Second, I question the prevailing hostility towards direct marketing assisted 
by data mining.2  While direct marketing imposes some negative utility on 
every recipient by consuming some of the recipient’s scarce attention, direct 
marketing can enhance overall social welfare.  Data mining specifically can 
increase the likelihood that a particular message enhances social welfare. 
Direct marketing’s effect on attention leads to three policy observations.  
First, we should not allow attention consumption concerns to foreclose 
socially beneficial communications between minority interests.  Second, we 
should not discourage marketers from targeting their marketing 
communications, including using data mining as appropriate.  Finally, we 
should not discourage the display of summary/preview content that 
recipients can use to make efficient sorting decisions. 
2. DATA MINING AS AN INCHOATE 
ACTIVITY 
Although the term “data mining” is often treated as a term of art, it 
actually has multiple definitions.3  To understand the term, we need to 
understand a bit about database operations as illustrated in the following 
figure:4 
 
Aggregate Sort Use
 
Figure #-1. Model of Database Operations 
To build a database (or “data warehouse”), a data controller first obtains 
data, either from interactions with data subjects (such as by asking the data 
subject to volunteer information or by recording interactions between the 
data subject and the system) or from third party sources, such as data 
vendors or business partners providing joint services to the data subject. 
 
2 See, e.g., ANNE W. BRANSCOMB, WHO OWNS INFORMATION? (Basic Books 1994). 
3 See McClurg, supra note 1, at 71 & n.50. 
4 See generally Tal Z. Zarsky, Desperately Seeking Solutions: Using 
Implementation-Based Solutions for the Troubles of Information Privacy in the 
Age of Data Mining and the Internet Society, 56 ME. L. REV. 13, 17-31 (2004) 
(describing an analogous three-stage process). 
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After obtaining data, the data controller may aggregate the data into one 
or more databases.  In theory, a data controller could aggregate all data 
collected from or about a data subject into a single database.  The reality, of 
course, is far different.  A data controller may obtain data that it does not 
aggregate into the data warehouse.  For example, a data subject may use an 
“email this page to a friend” web tool where the data subject provides two 
email addresses (the data subject’s and the friend’s), but neither address may 
be added to the data warehouse.  Other examples include non-web 
communications, such as customer support emails, telephone calls or in-
person communications, where the data subject may provide valuable data to 
the data controller but the data controller may lack a technical or operational 
means to add that data to its data warehouse. 
Further, in some cases, the data controller may have multiple independent 
databases instead of a single unified data warehouse.  In these situations, 
fragmented database architecture may prevent the data controller from 
“connecting the dots” about that data subject. 
Once data is aggregated, the data controller can sort it in a variety of 
ways, such as (1) using personally identifying information as a criteria (or 
not), (2) systematically or on an ad hoc basis, and (3) using rudimentary 
criteria (e.g., provide every mailing address we have) or very sophisticated 
criteria (e.g., every Wisconsin resident who purchased wool sweaters on a 
Friday evening during the last month). 
After sorting, the data controller or a third party can use the sorted data to 
take some action or make some decision.  For example, sorted data can be 
used to determine whether a data subject is extended credit, hired (or fired), 
treated differently from other customers (such as enhanced status in a 
customer loyalty program), or targeted for a marketing communication. 
I define “data mining” as data aggregation and sorting done as 
preparation for some subsequent data use.  In doing so, I distinguish data 
mining from data use.  Privacy advocates often consider mere data 
aggregation and sorting to be harmful, regardless of how the sorted data is 
used.5  But how, exactly, does mere data aggregation or sorting cause harm?  
While data mining may be a predicate to some unwanted use, how do the 
preparatory activities cause harm by themselves? 
A hypothetical situation illustrates how data aggregation and sorting, 
without use, lacks any meaningful consequences.  Assume a data controller 
aggregates the following data about data subjects into a database: social 
security numbers, birthdates, addresses, gender, race, sexual orientation and 
HIV status.  The data controller then initiates a query: identify all 
homosexual Latino males over 40 who live in Texas and have tested positive 
5 See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, Symposium: Cyberspace and Privacy: A New 
Legal Paradigm?: The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461 (2000).  
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for HIV, and list their addresses, social security numbers and birth dates.  
The computer generates a results list.  However, the list is not displayed to a 
human, printed out, archived or further processed by the computer; instead, 
it is immediately discarded. 
This hypothetical is admittedly implausible because this behavior lacks 
business sense.  However, the hypothetical demonstrates the illogic of 
focusing on aggregation and sorting divorced from usage.  How have the 
data subjects identified on this list been harmed?   
Unquestionably, many data subjects would object to public disclosure of 
this information.  Being identified on this list might publicize private facts, 
like sexual orientation or health condition, that could lead to further adverse 
treatment.  Disclosure of the information could allow identity thieves to prey 
on the individual. 
However, based on the hypothethical’s parameters, none of these adverse 
consequences would or could occur.  Indeed, no adverse consequence of any 
sort occurs because the world is exactly the same whether the list is 
generated or not.  The data subject does not experience any change, 
internally (the data subject never knows that the list was generated) or 
externally (no one else knows either).  This situation brings to mind the 
ancient Zen parable: if a tree falls in a forest and no one is around to hear it, 
does it make a sound?  Applied to this hypothetical, we might restate the 
parable: whether the tree makes a sound or not, why do we care?   
Some privacy advocates view privacy as a fundamental right6 or believe 
that data subjects have the right to control their information.7  To them, this 
hypothetical might still be objectionable despite the seeming lack of 
consequences.  By engaging in behavior the data subject might find 
objectionable if known, the data controller deprives the data subject of 
control over their circumstances even if the behavior has no perceivable 
consequences.  
It is, of course, impossible to refute the argument that privacy is a 
fundamental right.  Social scientists cannot empirically prove or disprove the 
claim, and no single objective source authoritatively classifies what 
constitutes a fundamental right.  Instead, classification of fundamental rights 
often devolves into an irresolute binary polemic (“Yes it is!”  “No it’s not!”).  
I am not attempting to resolve that debate.  For people who believe that 
privacy is a fundamental right, this Essay will not convince them otherwise.  
6 See Council Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing 
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 1(1), 1995 O.J. (L 
281) 31, 38. 
7 See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. 
L. REV. 1193 (1998). 
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The rest of us, however, cannot understand how inconsequential data 
aggregation and sorting is inherently harmful. 
While privacy advocates generally reject data mining in all of its forms, 
many privacy advocates harbor particular animus towards the sale of data by 
one data controller to another.8  However, data sales, without more, are 
indistinguishable from other types of preparatory data mining.  We can see 
this by slightly modifying the prior hypothetical.  Assume that data 
controller #1 generates the results list and electronically sends it to data 
controller #2 for a fee, but data controller #2 (instead of data controller #1) 
immediately discards the results list without looking at it or acting on it.  In 
this situation, the data is exposed to a new party (data controller #2), but the 
data subject still does not experience any consequences from this transfer.  It 
remains as much a non-event to the data subject as the initial hypothetical. 
Admittedly, both hypotheticals are highly stylized because the actors’ 
behavior does not make business sense.  However, the data controller’s 
motivations for data mining are irrelevant.  Even the worst motivations do 
not make inconsequential behavior consequential.  Data mining becomes 
consequential only when the data mining leads to some impactful use.  In 
other words, all of the preparatory steps prior to data use result in harm only 
if the usage results in harm.  Therefore, to determine the possible harms from 
data mining, we need to understand how the data is used.9   
In this respect, data mining concerns are analogous to concerns about the 
regulation of new technologies.  The technology community regularly argues 
that regulators should outlaw bad technology uses, not the technology itself.  
I advocate a similar approach to data mining.  Data mining is not the 
problem; the problem is bad uses of mined data, and that is where our focus 
should lie. 
3. MARKETING COMMUNICATIONS AND 
ATTENTION CONSUMPTION 
To many, using personal information to send direct marketing (including 
junk mail, telemarketing and spam) is the archetypical bad use of data 
mining.  Recipients passionately hate direct marketing10 and may transfer 
8 See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 2055 (2004). 
9 See Zarsky, supra note 4. 
10 See, e.g., Consumer Perceptions of Various Advertising Mediums, Dynamic Logic 
Beyond The Click (Mar. 2004) (showing that consumer attitudes towards 
telemarketing, spam and direct mail are significantly more negative than ads 
delivered through other media), at 
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negative feelings to data mining by association.  However, the academic 
literature is surprisingly opaque about why consumers hate direct 
marketing.11  Why do people object to direct marketing so much, or stated in 
economic terms, how does direct marketing create negative utility? 
3.1 A Utility Model of Direct Marketing 
To analyze these questions, we can model an individual recipient’s utility 
from a single direct marketing communication.  The total utility contains 
three discrete components. 
Substantive Utility.  To the extent that the recipient is substantively 
exposed to the content (as opposed to discarding the message without being 
exposed to the substantive content), the recipient derives utility from the 
communication’s content.  An individual’s response to the communication’s 
contents can vary from highly positive (e.g., contents will lead to a 
transaction producing significant consumer surplus) to highly negative (e.g., 
the contents were uninteresting and offensive/objectionable).   
Attention Utility.  Attention is a scarce resource, both temporally (we 
have only a certain number of attention-minutes in our lives) and at any one 
time (we can only pay simultaneous attention to a limited number of focal 
targets).  Each communication consumes some of the recipient’s attention.  
Reaction Utility.  Recipients may derive utility from their reaction to 
receiving a communication.  For example, many recipients are annoyed to 
receive a telephone call during dinner or a favorite TV show, regardless of 
the communication’s contents.12 
Formula #1 recaps the model for an individual’s utility derived from a 
single marketing communication: 
NPU = SU + AU + RU (Formula #1) 
 
http://www.dynamiclogic.com/na/research/btc/beyond_the_click_mar2004_part2.
html (last visited Dec. 29, 2004). 
11 See Eric Goldman, Where’s the Beef? Dissecting Spam’s Purported Harms, 22 J. 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 13 (2003) (discussing possible reasons why 
recipients hate spam). 
12 While typically consumers derive negative utility from their reaction to the 
interruption/intrusion of direct marketing communications, in some cases this 
reaction can generate positive utility.  See Susan Chang & Mariko Morimoto, An 
Assessment of Consumer Attitudes toward Direct Marketing Channels: A 
Comparison between Unsolicited E-Mail and Postal Direct Mail (Apr. 1, 2003) 
(quoting one student as getting a “thrill” when he receives mail, even if it is 
“junk”), at http://www.inma.org/subscribers/papers/2003-Chang-Morimoto.doc 
(last visited Dec. 29, 2004). 
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where  
 NPU = net private utility 
 SU = substantive utility 
 AU = attention utility  
 RU = reaction utility 
3.2 Attention Consumption and Externalities 
Compared to SU and RU, the AU component of Formula #1 has received 
little scrutiny from commentators.  This is somewhat surprising because all 
recipients experience negative utility from having their scarce attention 
consumed.  Thus, AU is the only component that is guaranteed to be 
negative for all recipients (with respect to SU and RU, recipients may derive 
positive, negative or no utility). 
Because direct marketing communications create negative AU for every 
recipient, some commentators have analogized these communications to 
negative externalities like pollution.13  Taking this argument to its logical 
conclusion, marketers overproduce direct marketing communications 
because the true social cost (including the negative AU imposed on every 
recipient) is greater than the marketers’ private costs.  If so, economically 
efficient levels of production could be reached by forcing the externality 
producer (the marketer) to internalize the externalized costs (the attention 
consumed), such as through a cost-internalizing tax (a “Pigouvian tax”).  
Alternatively, some commentators have proposed schemes that would allow 
consumers to shift costs to marketers.14 
Unfortunately, the analogy between pollution and direct marketing does 
not survive critical scrutiny.  Pollution constitutes a negative externality 
because it imposes negative utility on everyone.  By focusing solely on the 
AU component of Formula #1, direct marketing looks analogous to pollution 
because it too imposes negative utility on all recipients.  However, it is 
analytically inaccurate to isolate a single component of Formula #1 to assess 
the social utility of direct marketing.  While pollution uniformly generates 
negative utility on all affected individuals, direct marketing recipients can 
experience positive NPU from the communication even though the AU 
component may be negative. 
13 See, e.g., Kenneth C. Laudon, Markets and Privacy, COMM. OF THE ACM, Sept. 
1996, at 92. 
14 See Ian Ayres & Matthew Funk, Marketing Privacy, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 77 
(2003); Laudon, supra note 13.  According to the Coase Theorem, it is unclear 
how these cost-shifting efforts would change the outcome.  See Ronald Coase, 
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
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In addition, direct marketing may facilitate marketplace competition.15  
As a result, non-recipients of a marketing communication may benefit from 
lower prices or better products caused by the marketing communication.  
This non-recipient effect may constitute a positive externality from the 
communication. 
In theory, we could calculate the social welfare impact of a direct 
marketing communication by adding together all recipients’ NPUs, the 
marketer’s net private utility, and any externalities (positive or negative) 
generated by the marketing communication.   
In practice, of course, this calculation cannot be made on an ex ante basis 
because the recipients’ interests are heterogeneous but undisclosed.  No 
one—not the government, not the marketer, perhaps not even recipients 
themselves—precisely knows the recipients’ substantive interests, tolerance 
of attention consumption or reaction to receiving a communication.  
Indeed, a recipient’s utility may vary from day to day.  Consider the 
following example.  A marketer delivers to Jane a coupon offering a $100 
discount on a new Dell computer.  In scenario 1, the coupon arrives after 
Jane has already decided to buy a Dell but before she has made the purchase.  
In this case, the coupon may generate significant positive utility for Jane.  In 
scenario 2, the coupon arrives immediately after Jane has made her purchase 
and cannot take advantage of the coupon.  In this case, the coupon may be 
irrelevant; indeed, it could be upsetting because Jane may develop buyer’s 
remorse (because she thinks she overpaid).  As this example illustrates, the 
utility generated by a particular marketing communication varies 
dynamically, making reliable computations impossible. 
3.3 Policy Implications 
While the social welfare effects of direct marketing communications may 
be indeterminate, the prior discussion suggests three policy observations. 
3.3.1 Observation #1: Everyone Must Tolerate Some 
Communications of Interest Only to a Minority of Recipients 
Because the social welfare effects from a particular direct marketing 
communication are unknown (and unknowable) ex ante, we cannot assume 
the message has negative net social welfare.  Indeed, even if most recipients 
experience negative utility from a communication, the communication could 
still create net positive social utility if the remaining recipients (or non-
recipients benefiting from positive externalities) experience more positive 
15 See Lee Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J.L. & 
ECON. 337 (1972). 
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NPU than the negative NPU experienced by the majority recipients.  This 
scenario most likely arises when a communication is extremely useful to a 
minority community and the majority of recipients are simply uninterested.  
Preferably marketers will do more targeting (discussed in Observation #2) to 
avoid unnecessary impositions on uninterested recipients, but this is not 
always possible.   
Overresponding to majority interests regarding messages that are broadly 
unpopular but extremely useful to minority recipients could reduce social 
welfare.  Ultimately, members of the majority must have some attention 
consumed by unwanted or irrelevant messages as the “price tag” of allowing 
members of the minority to communicate with each other.16 
3.3.2 Observation #2: Facilitate Marketer Targeting 
While we each must tolerate some unwanted messages catering to 
minority interests, social welfare would improve if marketers did a better job 
of targeting their messages.  In an ideal world, marketers would 
communicate only with recipients who derive positive SU from the message, 
and recipients would receive only communications that create positive SU.17  
While we may never reach this idyllic state, we would nevertheless benefit 
by encouraging marketers to do more targeting. 
Data mining can help marketers with this targeting, which in turn could 
increase social welfare.  Therefore, it would be counterproductive to set up a 
regulatory scheme that discourages marketers from engaging in data mining. 
Beyond data mining, marketers are developing other technologies to infer 
consumers’ undisclosed and latent interests.  An example of this technology 
16 Everyone has some interests that are minority in nature.  Our obligation to 
tolerate—and defend—minority interests that do not coincide with our own 
interests reminds me of the poem First They Came… by Reverend Martin 
Niemöller: 
First they came for the communists, and I did not speak out— 
because I was not a communist; 
Then they came for the socialists, and I did not speak out— 
because I was not a socialist; 
Then they came for the trade unionists, and I did not speak out— 
because I was not a trade unionist; 
Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak out— 
because I was not a Jew; 
Then they came for me— 
and there was no one left to speak out for me. 
17 See JOHN HAGEL III & MARC SINGER, NET WORTH: SHAPING MARKETS WHEN 
CUSTOMERS MAKE THE RULES (Harv. Bus. Sch. Press 1999) (arguing that 
“infomediaries” would mediate communications between marketers and 
consumers to improve marketing targeting for both groups). 
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is “adware,” which monitors an individual’s online behavior and, based on 
the activity, generates marketing communications that reflect the adware 
vendor’s prediction of the individual’s interests.  These technologies may 
allow marketers to significantly improve message targeting. 
However, a regulatory assault on relevancy-improving technologies 
threatens their development.  For example, in March 2004, Utah enacted a 
law prohibiting adware vendors from delivering certain types of contextually 
relevant advertising even if the recipient wanted it.18  Although this law was 
preliminarily enjoined in June 2004,19 it represents an all-too-common 
regulatory paranoia about marketers engaging in social welfare-enhancing 
targeting efforts. 
In part, this paranoia reflects the inherent tension between “privacy” and 
relevancy targeting.  To provide consumers with more highly targeted 
marketing, marketers must know more about an individual’s interests—
including latent interests that the individual may not be able to articulate 
even if asked.  However, the more data that marketers capture about 
individuals, the greater the privacy concerns.  As discussed in Part 2 supra, 
this tension can be resolved only by focusing on bad uses of data, not by 
prophylatically inhibiting data mining or other data aggregation/sorting 
techniques.  When regulating bad data uses, we must be very careful not to 
mischaracterize socially beneficial targeting as a bad data use. 
3.3.3 Observation #3: Facilitate Recipients’ Ability to Make 
Predictive Relevancy Judgments 
Each marketing communication necessarily consumes some of the 
recipient’s attention for sorting purposes.  Ordinarily, a recipient will scan a 
marketing communication to make a predictive judgment about the 
message’s relevancy to the recipient’s interests.20  If the recipient initially 
deems the message irrelevant, the recipient will usually discard the message.  
On the other hand, if the recipient initially makes a predictive judgment that 
the communication may be relevant, the recipient usually then will do a 
more careful review to make an evaluative judgment of relevancy.21 
This two-stage review process suggests that social welfare can increase if 
recipients can make more efficient predictive judgments, thereby lessening 
the need to make more time-consuming evaluative judgments.  In other 
18 Utah Spyware Control Act, H.B. 323, 2004 General Session, Part 2 (Utah 2004). 
19 WhenU.com, Inc. v. Utah, Civil No. 0407097578 (Utah Dist. Ct. June 22, 2004), 
available at http://www.benedelman.org/spyware/whenu-utah/pi-ruling-
transcript.pdf.  
20 See Soo Young Rieh, Judgment of Information Quality and Cognitive Authority in 
the Web, 53 J. AM. SOC’Y FOR INFO. SCI. & TECH. 145, 150 (2002). 
21 Id. 
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words, each recipient will experience less negative utility due to attention 
consumption if the recipient can sort the communication faster. 
Recipients can make quicker predictive judgments if the marketing 
communication provides easy-to-scan content that summarizes or previews 
the marketing communication’s contents.  I refer to this summary or preview 
content as “filtering content.”  An email’s subject line is an example of 
filtering content.  If the subject line contains useful predictive information, 
many uninterested recipients can delete the email without having to open the 
email and scan its contents.  While reviewing email subject lines still 
consumes some of the recipient’s attention, the quick sorting can reduce the 
negative utility. 
Regulators recognize the importance of filtering content inconsistently.  
In some situations, regulations mandate filtering content.  For example, 
certain emails now must be labeled “advertising” or “sexually explicit,”22 
and telemarketers must display their name and phone number to recipients 
using caller identification devices.23   
However, regulations do not mandate or encourage filtering content in 
comparable circumstances.  For example, senders of direct mail are not 
required to include any filtering content on the envelope’s exterior—no 
name, return address or other predictive content of any type.  As a result, 
direct mail recipients often must open the envelope to make any predictive 
judgments.  
In yet other situations, the regulatory scheme discourages filtering 
content.  For example, some Internet trademark cases have imposed liability 
on an intermediary merely for displaying filtering content to searchers, 
irrespective of the filtering content’s usefulness in making predictive 
judgments.24  This type of liability may curtail the display of filtering content 
seen by searchers, thus unnecessarily consuming more attention. 
While regulations should not inhibit the provision of accurate filtering 
content, the converse proposition—requiring marketers to provide accurate 
filtering content—does not always hold true.  Specifying that recipients be 
22 See 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(5)(A)(i) (commercial electronic mail messages must 
provide “clear and conspicuous identification that the message is an 
advertisement or solicitation”); 16 C.F.R. § 316.1 (commercial electronic mail 
messages that include sexually oriented material must “include in the subject 
heading the phrase ‘SEXUALLY-EXPLICIT:’ in capital letters as the first 
nineteen (19) characters at the beginning of the subject line”). 
23 See 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(a)(7) (defining as an abusive telemarketing practice the 
failure “to transmit or cause to be transmitted the telephone number, and, when 
made available by the telemarketer's carrier, the name of the telemarketer, to any 
caller identification service in use by a recipient of a telemarketing call”). 
24 See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 467 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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exposed to filtering content structures how the recipients’ attention will be 
consumed, which may require more attention from recipients than would 
have been required without the regulation.  If so, the additional benefits of 
the mandatory filtering content need to be weighed against the implicit 
attention consumption costs.25  Mandatory filtering content could create 
social welfare, but regulators rarely or never balance the attention 
consumption costs they are imposing—and they should. 
Furthermore, even when mandatory filtering content creates positive net 
social welfare, the filtering content should reflect how individuals process 
information.  Usually, regulators determine what mandatory filtering content 
to require based on intuitive assumptions about individuals’ informational 
needs.  However, regulators often have no training in human cognitive 
processes and thus may require unhelpful filtering content (or fail to require 
useful filtering content).  To the extent that regulators determine that 
recipients should get filtering content, regulators should rely upon experts, 
such as information scientists, to structure the filtering content in a useful 
and efficient manner. 
4. CONCLUSION 
People who obsess over data mining are misdirecting their energies.  
Data mining is not the problem; at worst, it is just a preparatory step towards 
a problem.  In the case of direct marketing, data mining is a beneficial 
preparatory step, and social welfare would improve if direct marketers used 
it more often.   
The obsession with data mining as a standalone harm has also masked the 
important role of attention consumption in direct marketing.  Properly 
isolated, we can see the value of trying to conserve attention where it is 
conservable; but we also recognize that everyone must sacrifice some 
attention to preserve breathing room for communications catering to 
minority interests.   
25 There may be other costs to consider, such as the marketer’s production and 
compliance costs. 
